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Abstract

“The Rules” are found in a collaborative document (started in March 2010) that states principles for
responsibility when a computer artifact is designed, developed and deployed into a sociotechnical system.
At this writing, over 50 people from nine countries have signed onto The Rules (Ad Hoc Committee,
2010). Unlike codes of ethics, The Rules are not tied to any organization, and computer users as well as
computing professionals are invited to sign onto The Rules. The emphasis in The Rules is that both users
and professionals have responsibilities in the production and use of computing artifacts. In this paper, we
use The Rules to examine issues of trust.

Introduction

“The Rules” are found in a collaborative document (started in March 2010) that states principles for
responsibility when a computer artifact is designed, developed and deployed into a sociotechnical system.
At this writing, over 50 people (including the authors of this paper) from nine countries have signed onto
The Rules (Ad Hoc Committee, 2010). Unlike codes of ethics, The Rules are not tied to any organization,
and computer users as well as computing professionals are invited to sign onto The Rules.
Based on the theories of (Floridi and Sanders, 2001) and (Floridi, 2008), we have used levels of abstraction
to examine ethical issues created by computing technology (see (Grodzinsky et al., 2008) and (Wolf et al.,
2011)).  In those analyses, we used three levels of abstraction: LoA1, the users’ perspective; LoA2, the
developers’ perspective; and LoAS, the perspective of society at large. Our analysis of quantum computing
and cloud computing, focused on computing professionals at LoA2, delivering functionality to users at
LoA1 (Wolf et al., 2011). Our emphasis was on the professionals being worthy of the trust of users in that
delivery.
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Our analysis of The Rules in this paper differs starkly from the earlier analyses of quantum and cloud
computing. The Rules are not a computing paradigm; they are a paradigm for thinking about the impact of
computing artifacts. The emphasis in The Rules is different from a technical computing project: both users
and professionals are invited to acknowledge their responsibilities in the production and use of computing
artifacts. Yet there are some aspects of the earlier analyses, especially in the area of trust, that are relevant
to The Rules. In quantum computing, the implementers of quantum algorithms will likely not meet most
of the users of those algorithms, and although we don’t anticipate that communications are likely between
individual users and the quantum developers, the trust relationship will be forged through the medium
of the quantum algorithms. Inherent in the design of cloud computing is the notion that the people who
maintain the computing resources of the cloud are remote from the users of those resources. Humans are
clearly crucial in the sociotechnical systems of cloud computing. But most of the relationships will be
based on e-trust, not on face-to-face interactions. Trust issues are more complex in these new computing
paradigms, and it is our assertion that The Rules can inform a discussion of these issues.
The first part of this paper presents The Rules. The Rules document currently includes five rules that are
intended to serve “as a normative guide for people who design, develop, deploy, evaluate or use computing
artifacts.” Next we briefly examine a model of trust and the relationship between The Rules and society
through the lens of trust. In other words, we will examine how computing artifacts and the sociotechnical
system of which they are a part, serve as a medium through which trust relationships are played out. Then,
we shall examine each rule vis-à-vis the sociotechnical system and trust. The existence and proliferation
of computing artifacts and the growing sophistication of sociotechnical systems do not insulate users and
developers from the need to trust and the obligation to be trustworthy. Instead, we are convinced that the
power and complexity of these systems require us to be more dependent on trust relationships, not less.
In the last section of the paper we illustrate this last statement by applying the Rules to the paradigms of
quantum and cloud computing.

What Are The Rules?

“The Rules” began at a face-to-face meeting early in 2010, but many of the people who have now signed
on to The Rules have not met each other face to face. The Rules has become a project explicitly based on
Internet interactions. This aspect of The Rules is something that we often see in analyzing an ethical issue
involving sociotechnical systems: there are people who are critical components in any such system, and
often some of those people meet face to face. But sometimes, and increasingly often, after a computing
artifact is “launched,” many (and sometimes most) of the ensuing interactions and relationships are
computer-mediated.
The five rules in version 27 are:
Rule 1: The people who design, develop, or deploy a computing artifact are morally responsible for that
artifact, and for the foreseeable effects of that artifact. This responsibility is shared with other people who
design, develop, deploy or knowingly use the artifact as part of a sociotechnical system.
Rule 2: The shared responsibility of computing artifacts is not a zero-sum game. The responsibility of
an individual is not reduced simply because more people become involved in designing, developing,
deploying or using the artifact.   Instead, a person’s responsibility includes being answerable for the
behaviors of the artifact and for the artifact’s effects after deployment, to the degree to which these effects
are reasonably foreseeable by that person.
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Rule 3: People who knowingly use a particular computing artifact are morally responsible for that use.
Rule 4: People who knowingly design, develop, deploy, or use a computing artifact can do so responsibly
only when they make a reasonable effort to take into account the sociotechnical systems in which the
artifact is embedded.
Rule 5: People who design, develop, deploy, promote, or evaluate a computing artifact should not explicitly
or implicitly deceive users about the artifact or its foreseeable effects, or about the sociotechnical systems
in which the artifact is embedded.
The Rules echo a theme that was developed in our earlier analyses: those at LoA2 owe a special duty of
care to users at LoA1 (see (Grodzinsky et al. 2008) and (Wolf et al. 2011). Those who produce and sell
computer artifacts are to act in a manner that is worthy of trust. But unlike the previous analyses, The
Rules require that both computer professionals and users be trustworthy to society as a whole, reinforcing
the inclusion of LoAS in the analysis of computer ethics.

A Model of Trust

We will use the following principles of trust developed by (Taddeo, 2008) and (Taddeo, 2009) and the
model of trust in (Grodzinsky et al., 2011) (see the next section) as the basis for our discussion of trust
relationships and The Rules.
1. Trust is a relation between a (the trustor) and b (the trustee). NOTE: a and b can be human or
an artificial agent (AA).  A relation (certainly in the mathematical sense, but also in the sociological
sense) can involve both.
2. Trust is a decision by a to delegate to b some aspect of importance to a in achieving a goal.
NOTE: We rely on the notion that an artificial entity a includes “decisions” (implemented by,
for example, IF/THEN/ELSE statements), and we assume that a’s decisions are designed and
implemented with the assumption that there is a high probability that b will behave as expected.
3. Trust involves risk; the less information the trustor a has about the trustee b, the higher the
risk and the more trust is required.  NOTE: this is true for both artificial and human entities.  In
AAs, we expect that risk and trust are quantified or at least categorized explicitly; in humans, we
do not expect that this proportionality is measured with mathematical precision.
4. The trustor a has the expectation of gain by trusting the trustee b. NOTE: With respect to
AAs, “expectation of gain” may refer to the expectation of the AA’s designer in moving toward
a particular goal, or it may refer to an explicit expression in the source code that identifies this
expected gain, or both.
5. The trustee b may or may not be aware that trustor a trusts b. NOTE: If b is human,
circumstances may have prevented b from knowing that a trusts b. The same is true if b is an
AA, but there is also some possibility that an AA trustee b may not even be capable of “knowing”
anything in the traditional human sense.
6. Positive outcomes when a trusts b encourage a to continue trusting b. NOTE: If a is an AA, this
cycle of trust → good outcome → more trust could be explicit in the design and implementation
of the AA, or else it could be implicit in data relationships, as in a neural net.
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We contend that these principles are attributes that belong to any type of trust, be it e-trust or face-to-face
(f2f)-trust.

An Object Oriented Model of Trust

In a previous paper, we developed a model of trust based on object oriented software development principles
(Grodzinsky et al., 2011).    The superclass of the trust model is“XYZtrust” which represents what is
common to eight subclasses of trust. In each of these eight subclasses, we can locate a set of possible trust
relationships.  The letters X, Y, and Z in XYZtrust stand for important aspects of the trust relationship. X
and Y classify the trustor and trustee respectively as either human (H) or artificial (A); and Z specifies if
the trust is established either face-to-face (P, or “physical”) or electronic (E). These three binary variables
establish the eight possible subclasses of XYZtrust, and each subclass is more concrete than the more
abstract superclass XYZtrust. Each subclass is still an abstract description analogous to a template, and
that template represents many possible instantiations of trust relationships. A list follows that enumerates
the eight subclasses, along with an example of a trust relationship that fits into that subclass.
HH-Ptrust: traditional notion of human, “face-to-face” trust; most discussions of “trust” presuppose this
subclass
HH-Etrust: humans trust each other, but mediated exclusively by electronic means
HA-Ptrust: human trusts a physically present AA, for example, a robot (no electronic mediation)
HA-Etrust: human trusts an artificial entity (for example, a web bot) over the Internet
AH-Ptrust: an AA, perhaps a robot, trusts a physically present human
AH-Etrust: an AA, perhaps a web bot, trusts a human based on Internet interactions
AA-Ptrust: an AA trusts another AA in a physical encounter; because this is Ptrust, the AAs might, for
example, use sign language
AA-Etrust: an AA trusts another AA electronically, e.g., two web bots communicate via the Internet
Each instance of an XYZtrust subclass is either all P or all E. Thus if two particular humans, participate in
HH-Etrust and also participate in HH-Ptrust, then we intend that these instances of trust be modeled with
two separate instantiations, one in HH-Etrust and the other in HH-Ptrust.
HHP
HAP
AHP
AAP

HHE
HAE
AHE
AAE

Table 1: Eight distinct subclasses of XYZ Trust

Table 1 lists the subclasses of XYZtrust. In this arrangement, the first column requires physical proximity,
and the second column is strictly electronic. In this paper, our analysis of The Rules focuses on the types
of trust relationships found in the first row. Although the other rows (each of which involves at least one
AA) have relevance to computing professionals (see Grodzinsky, et al, 2011), the Rules emphasize the
human relationships at stake in sociotechnical systems that involve computing.
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The Rules, Trust and Society

The Rules are an attempt to change people’s minds about moral responsibility for computing artifacts.
The people who have signed The Rules thus far are people aware of the computing details known
by developers. However, if The Rules are to have a wider impact, that impact will be observable at
LoAS. Whenever computing professionals take seriously their collective and individual responsibilities
for computing artifacts, they act in ways that enhance public trust in computing. Insofar as The Rules
successfully encourage computing professionals to act this way; The Rules will enhance public trust.
But The Rules can also be seen as a challenge to computing professionals, a call to account for the artifacts
they design, develop and deploy. Seen in this way, The Rules could be interpreted by some as a reason
for society as a whole to trust computing professionals less, especially if computing professionals resist
acknowledging the responsibilities outlined in The Rules. The extent to which The Rules have either
of these effects on society (or any discernible effect at all) can best be examined (either theoretically or
empirically) at LoAS.
Although computer users may often act as if they are trusting machines, The Rules insist that the people
who design, develop and deploy these machines are directly responsible for the machines and their effects.
In addition, The Rules state that people who use these machines are responsible for how they are used. We
can restate that emphasis in the following way: those who design, develop and deploy computing artifacts
are placed in a relationship of trust with those who use the artifacts. The computing artifacts and the
sociotechnical system that the artifacts are embedded in act as a medium through which a trust relationship
is played out between people.
The Rules also state that users are responsible for the consequences of their use of computing artifacts.
In this relationship, users are in a trust relationship with people who are affected (or potentially affected)
by the use of a computing artifact (the “penumbra”). Again, the computing artifact and the sociotechnical
system of which it is a part serve as a medium through which trust relationships are played out among
people.

Rule 1: The Major Players in Computing Trust

Rule 1 identifies two groups of people: those who create a computing artifact and those who use a
computing artifact in a sociotechnical system: the creators of the artifact (designers and developers) and
the users (who deploy the artifact). Thus, there are three trust relationships that must be considered: trust
among the designers and developers themselves; trust between users and creators; and trust between users
and the penumbra. Both the group and individuals in the group that create computing artifacts must take
on moral responsibility for the artifact. Individuals must trust that other team members in the group are
willing to accept the moral responsibility that Rule 1 calls for. That is, there is an accepted goal among the
creators of the artifact to examine the effects of that artifact on society and to perform their functions with
the appropriate standard of care. This is a familiar theme in professional ethics and addresses the problem
of “many hands” that Helen Nissenbaum cites as a problem of computing accountability (Nissenbaum,
2007).
In the second trust relationship, between the users and the creators of the artifact, the users who trust
developers will buy their products and use them with confidence.  
In the third relationship, it is less essential that those who use a particular artifact in a particular sociotechnical
system develop any sort of trust with those in the penumbra who use that particular artifact in the same or
any other sociotechnical system. Nor is there any strong need for the development of trust among people
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employing different computing artifacts in the same sociotechnical system. More essential is the response
of the users and creators when it is evident at LoAS that the artifact is causing an unanticipated problem.

Rule 2: Many Hands and Trust

Rule 2 emphasizes the need for a high degree of trust between users of a computing artifact and the
creators of a computing artifact. It is intuitive that the users of a computing artifact will need to trust
the creators of the artifact.  The users trust that the artifact meets its specification.  That is, the artifact
should do what it is supposed to do, and using the artifact in its intended way does not result in unintended
negative consequences. Ironically, most software developers, both proprietary and free and open source
developers, disclaim all warranties for software, even when the software is used for its intended purpose.
But this user → creator trust has an inverse.  Creators also have trust issues with their users in addition to
the ones cited in Rule 1. For example, developers trust (or at least hope) that users will honor the relevant
licensing agreements. (Notice that this is true for both proprietary software and for Free and Open Source
software.)
Furthermore, developers need to trust that users will not use the computer artifact in bizarre, unanticipated
ways. With the moral responsibility that Rule 1 brings to bear on the artifact creators for the foreseeable
effects of the use of the artifact, the developers need to trust that users will not use the artifact in some
unforeseeable, negative or potentially dangerous way. Such use may bring needless risk to society. Honest
statements by the creators of an artifact regarding the intended use of the artifact build should be honored
by users to further the trust that both groups have in each other. A user, who intends to use an artifact for
an unintended purpose, ought to seek advice from its creator regarding the new, unanticipated use, in order
to ascertain whether the intended use is consistent with the moral responsibilities outlined by The Rules.
One concern regarding using a computing artifact for an unintended purpose is the damage such use might
bring to the fabric of trust that has been built between computing artifact developers and society. An
artifact user bears the responsibility of weighing the potential damage any unintended use of the artifact
may bring to this important trust relationship.

Rule 3: Users, Trust, and Society

Rule 3 mitigates some of the concerns regarding trust and the unintended use of a computing artifact.
However, even though according to The Rules, the knowing user of the computing artifact bears moral
responsibility, we are still concerned about the damage to the developer/society trust relationship such use
would bring. Users also have a wider responsibility towards society. The power of a computing artifact
brings with it the responsibility to use that power in a way that respects other people. Thus, users of a
computing artifact must act in a way that is trustworthy with respect to society; this trustworthiness should
be observable at LoAS.

Rule 4: Sociotechnical Systems and Trust

Computer artifacts are “connections” among people; the emphasis in Rule 4 widens this focus.
Sociotechnical systems include computing artifacts, but also encompass customs, laws, regulations,
cultural norms, infrastructure, and any other factors that make the development and use of the artifacts
possible. But developers and users are responsible for their choices to participate in these sociotechnical
systems. Society expects these systems to benefit society, and trusts both computing professionals, as well
as other people who participate in these systems, to develop and use them responsibly.
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Joseph Weizenbaum (1984) and Bill Joy (2000) both argued that developers have a choice in the kinds of
computer science research to undertake and the kinds of artifacts to develop. They both suggest that there
may be certain areas of research that we should be careful exploring, or at least, we should be honest about
the limitations of the artifact because often we cannot predict the effects of the artifact on society. Our
increasing societal reliance on socio-technical systems, the enormous reach and impact of these systems,
and the accelerating rate of changes in these systems, make this choice a difficult one for computing
professionals. The difficulty does not absolve computing professionals from their responsibility to make
their choices deliberately and wisely.

Rule 5: Truth-Telling and Trust

Issac Asimov is given credit for an interesting quote about humans and computing artifacts: “Part of
the inhumanity of the computer is that, once it is competently programmed and working smoothly, it is
completely honest.” (Asimov)
Trust and honesty are deeply linked. Rule 5’s statements about not deceiving others go a long way toward
building trust. As honest statements about computing artifacts are made, and it becomes clear that the
statements are true when the artifacts are deployed (observed at LoAS), society builds trust in the claims
of artifact creators. Overstatements or a lack of candor about the weaknesses or dangers of particular
artifacts and sociotechnical systems will erode that trust. For example, when an Intel processing chip had
a hardware error that occurred in certain kinds of division, the company tried to stonewall and said that it
had an infinitesimal probability of occurring, and it would be expensive to fix this error. Under pressure
from engineers who feared that these chips would not be reliable—imagine them in an avionics system
where deaths could occur—Intel eventually relented. Trust in the company was restored when Intel owned
up to the error, redid the masks and issued substitute chips at no cost to the users.
While we acknowledge that no software is error free, we observe a lack of trust in companies such as
Apple or Microsoft at LoAS when users refuse to buy first generation products.   Consumers continue
to buy products after software failures, but this is often seen as a necessary evil, not a reflection of trust.
Lawsuits about software failures reflect this lack of trust. (For example, see (Weier, 2008), (King, 2010),
and (Vijayan, 2010).)

WikiLeaks: A Case Study of Electronic Trust (and Distrust)

In 2010, the website WikiLeaks released numerous documents classified as secret to by the United States
government.  As the ramifications of these documents became apparent, numerous financial companies
broke their ties with WikiLeaks, depriving it of its main source of funding. In retaliation, WikiLeaks
supporters posted distributed denial of service (DDoS) software on Facebook and encouraged people to
download that software and install it on their computers. Once installed, the originators of the software
used those computers to send disruptive messages to retaliate against the financial institution’s computers,
making their websites almost completely inaccessible by anyone intending to conduct business with the
financial institutions.
There are numerous entities that come into consideration in this story including WikiLeaks, the developers
of the DDoS software, the developers of Facebook, the sociotechnical system created by Facebook, those
who installed the DDoS software on their computers, the users of the financial institutions websites, and
the financial institutions themselves.  Each of these entities is part of some trust relationship and serves to
illuminate the points we have made.
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Prior to the WikiLeaks incident, DDoS developers had done much to damage the trust between software
developers and users of software.   DDoS software was typically installed on a “user’s” computer
without the user’s knowledge and then used by the developer to cause harm to a third party.  This sort of
misappropriation of a user’s computer led to mistrust of the developer of the operating system.  Rule 3 is
clear about laying responsibility for the damage at the feet of those who deployed the DDoS since the user
rarely knows about the DDoS software existing on the user’s computer.
In the WikiLeaks incident, DDoS developers provided like-minded people the opportunity to participate in
an apparent act of civil disobedience. In this context, however, users of the DDoS software chose to install
the software on their computers. Rule 3 in this case, applies to the users, since they knowingly installed
the software and then knowingly relinquished control of it to those who launched the software. In this
context, the user trusts the developer to accomplish a goal for the user. Thus, the same sort of software,
depending on the sociotechnical context, facilitates and erodes trust between developers and users.
When considered at the LoAS, both uses of DDoS do little to facilitate trust between software developers
and society.  The users of the DDoS software have damaged the ability of people to access their financial
information at the targeted financial institutions.  General trust in software developers and the systems they
have developed is eroded.  Further, since many users of financial institution’s websites may not understand
that the DDoS is taking place, they may begin to lose trust in the financial institutions themselves.    Another
concern surrounding this incident is that unlike traditional acts of civil disobedience, the participants in the
DdoS—both those who allowed their computers to be used and those who orchestrated the attack—did
little to make their identities known.

What If We Don’t Trust? Applying The Rules to Cloud and
Quantum Computing

We asserted in our introduction that the existence and proliferation of computing artifacts and the growing
sophistication of sociotechnical systems do not somehow insulate us against the need to trust and the
obligation to be trustworthy. Instead, we are convinced that the power and complexity of these systems
require us to be more dependent on trust relationships, not less. This becomes clear when we consider
trust in new and emerging technologies. We analyze The Rules and trust as they apply to the relatively
new cloud computing and then to the emerging field of quantum computing.

Cloud Computing

Cloud computing is a term that encompasses many different technologies and sociotechnical systems.
However, most of these systems feature computing resources (both hardware and software) that are
remote from the users of the resources. Users access these resources via Internet connections and rely on
the providers of the resources to make the resources accessible and secure.
In most cases, the users and the providers of cloud computing will not physically meet. The relationships
between users and providers are, then, of the electronically mediated type described above. The emphasis
in The Rules on responsibility and honesty seem particularly appropriate to these HHE relationships. First,
cloud computing users must trust providers to take care of their data and software; this is fundamental
to the implicit social contract of cloud computing. Providers who are careless or cynically indifferent to
issues of accessibility and security are clearly not living up to the responsibilities described in The Rules.
Similarly, if concerns about the security and accessibility (both trust issues) discourage some from
exploiting cloud computing, and if cloud computing gives its users a competitive advantage (as its
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advocates claim), then these trust issues will have economic repercussions. If those who trust and commit
to cloud computing are disappointed by a serious breach of security or a lack of accessibility at an urgent
moment, then their trust will have been betrayed.
The Rules suggest another, perhaps less obvious, responsibility relevant to cloud computing: users of cloud
computing should not exploit computing resources from the cloud to do harm to others. For example, it
would be a clear violation of The Rules for someone to sign up for a particular cloud computing service,
and then use that access to steal data or disrupt the resources for other customers of that service. Both
providers and users are called to account by The Rules for responsible behavior.

Quantum Computing

Quantum computing is a relatively new field.  The fundamental nature of quantum computation has been
known for over thirty years, yet physicists are still trying to develop quantum computers that are of any
significant size.   One significant difference between quantum computers and digital computers is that
quantum computers are probabilistic in nature. That is, there are times that the output is not a correct
solution to the problem for the given inputs. Another thing that is known about quantum computers is that
a quantum computer of a given size will be significantly more powerful than digital computers of the same
size. It is important to note that there are small quantum computers available in the marketplace for highly
specialized applications. Trust and The Rules will play an important role as bigger quantum computers are
developed and they become commercially available.
Rule 1 ascribes moral responsibility to the creators of quantum computers for their foreseeable effects.
Given the potential power of this technology, quantum developers would be well-served by developing
trust among potential users and in society regarding these artifacts. As a nascent technology, developers
will have an economic interest in developing a user base. That user base needs to trust the claims of
the developers and society needs to trust that developers and users of quantum computers will bear
responsibility for their general use. Computer and information ethicists have a role to play here. We can
help analyze the impact that this new technology might have.
We have begun this process for quantum computation (Wolf et al., 2011).   We identified a potential
problem with secure communication when there are those with access to quantum computers.  Today’s
most common cryptographic methodologies are subject to attack by quantum computation. Those with
quantum computers will be in a position to decode any encrypted message they capture. The Rules
suggest that quantum developers are morally responsible for this situation and the impact it will have on
the social and economic systems of the world.

Conclusions

In this paper we have analyzed The Rules and the role trust plays among computing professionals, users and
society as a whole. We explored cloud computing and quantum computing as two examples of computing
paradigms in which trust and responsibility are key. This work on emerging computing paradigms builds
on earlier work by Weckert and Moor who examined how best to proceed in nanotechnology research when
there might be adverse effects at LoAS. Using the “precautionary principle” (Weckert and Moor, 2004:
12) assert: “If some action has a possibility of causing harm, then that action should not be undertaken
or some measure should be put in its place to minimize or eliminate the potential harms.” Their analysis
focuses primarily on the relationship of LoA2 and LoAS and examines the various types of harms and
risks of artifacts that could cause adverse effects at LoAS. Their claim about the necessity of weighing
benefits and harms is supported by The Rules. In addition, using models such as those developed by
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(Floridi, 2008) and (Grodzinsky et al., 2008) helps computing professionals, users, and society (LoA2,
LoA1 and LoAS) better understand issues of responsibility, risk and trust for particular computing artifacts
and sociotechnical systems.
Concerns such as those expressed by Weckert, Moor, Joy and Weizenbaum call into question the kinds of
research or development that should be pursued and at what cost. The Rules offer a way of assessing risks
so that if an artifact is a large risk for serious harm, development of that artifact can be curtailed or at least
more carefully managed. Although The Rules echo the sentiments of computer scientists and philosophers
that the burden of proof that an artifact is safe lies with the developer and is present at LoA2, The Rules
also advocate that all people involved with computing artifacts act in a manner that is trustworthy and
responsible. If people don’t act responsibly as they produce, promote and use computing artifacts, then
The Rules suggest that society should neither trust those people nor their artifacts. We contend that this is
true for all computing artifacts and for the sociotechnical systems in which they are embedded.
We are convinced that this need for
trustworthiness with respect to computing
artifacts and sociotechnical systems will be
visible at LoAS. Our future research plans
include examining empirical evidence at
LoAS that demonstrates the importance of
trustworthiness from participants at LoA1
and LoA2.
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